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• ' ' I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
: Case No. 
-vs- 14137 
• • • ' • • . 
DANIEL L. PECK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of aggravated 
assault in that he, with unlawful force and violence, knowingly 
and intentionally, caused serious bodily injury to Gary Ewe11. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 20, 1975, the matter was tried before a jury 
which found appellant guilty of aggravated assault as charged. 
Appellant was granted a suspended sentence and placed on proba-
tion for two years. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUG.IT UN APPEAL 
R e s p o n d e n t s u e k s *;... v i r m a n c e cX t h e v e r d i c t r e a c h e d 
by t h e l o w e r c o u r t . •' . 
: • ' STATEMENT OF FACTS "' '
 : . 
On t h e 7 t l 1 d a y o f D e c e m b e r , C / 4 , a I i p p r n x i i i u i c l y 
1 1.1.5 o ' c l o c k p . m . , f o u r ran ML, L on ,i CUJL.JI r o a d in..- ; P l e a s a n t 
G r o v e , U t a h , t o s e t Li-; • . l "* <o « * ,. < «, . . _., . ; . L 
Two men, G a r y E w e l l and C l a r e n c e N i e l s e n , a c c u s e d u . a i i u , 
JJLIU Pe » •" ' * »' i 1 • . s . r. ck w a s a c c o m p a n i e d t o t h e 
s c e n e k\ lu :• Lrf-I , i t , r f ' M . i i e l P e c ] : , Lhe a p p e l l a n t i n tri..^ ' a s e . 
. i:» • i - j i i u ] , iy a g r e e d t h a t D a n i e l w o u l d ror; 
p a r t i c i p a t e .in t h e f i y h L ( i 1 . J "A h ^ . w / j . 
• • A f t e r a p e r i o d c f A o n i L i n o , d ui Lrni w h i c h no w e a p o n s 
w e r e u s e d o t r i e r t h a n i i y i . . - r - r- - t h r o w n a l o c k 
o r t ^ o {rV 34(, C-Q) x r J A l e e r , v/.:;; on d i e q i o u n d w U h N i e l s e n 
s i t t i i i y un l'o.' ' • Pi •. c : J ..iiv..-.. ; A- < -\,;, o) f r o n t o f h i m 
/ m
 ? 5 i 5 0 f r A . 1 : o . , ru P e c k t e s t i f i e d in-il u U i l t h a t t i m e 
nobod ' • t . c. u~- u j s p i r t e d t e s t i m o n y a t 
: Li s pcLiiL cU;i l o v d i e u n e r A i e i s e n a n d E w e l l w e r e cord' I n u l n q l:o 
c= i ..-. > • . . (T„3L) ,MJ, (>y, 79) . H o w e v e r , a d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
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bystander, Harry Peacock, who had happened onto the fight, 
testified that neither Nielsen nor Ewell hit Jim while he 
was on the ground, although they were trying to turn him 
over or pull him up in order to fight with him further (T.20,30). 
At this point the appellant, who had been watching 
from a car, grabbed a rubber-coated steel tool, ordinarily used 
to change tires on his sports car. This weapon weighed about 
twd pounds and had a "lug nut thing" on the end of it (T.83). 
(Some witnesses described the weapon as looking like a hammer 
(T.21,36).) Appellant ran up behind Neilsen, without any word 
of warning (T.84), and hit him over the head (T.85). Appellant 
then struck Gary Ewell in the face (T . 22, 36,50) , and caused the 
loss of his left eye (T.12) . After making this attack, appellant 
ran back to his car and left the scene (T.22) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LESSER OFFENSE OF SIMPLE 
ASSAULT WERE UNWARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault/ On 
appeal, he contends that the jury should have been instructed 
-3-
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on the lesser included offense of simple assault, and that 
the trial court's failure to do so was prejudicial. 
Appellant is correct in pointing out that the 
offense of simple assault is necessarily included in the 
offense of aggravated assault. Appellant also correctly 
points out the general rule that a jury should be instructed 
on lesser included offenses when such a conviction would be 
warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence. State v. 
Hunter, 20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P.2d 208 (1968) ; State v. Nielson, 
30 Utah 2d 119, 514 P.2d 535 (1973). However, that rule may 
also be stated inversely: a jury need not be instructed on 
lesser included offenses when such a conviction would not be 
warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence. 
^
n
 Hunter, supra, this Court stated: 
"Where the facts points 
unerringly to deadly violence and 
not to a boxing match between the 
kids at the Y.M.C.A., there is 
little need to confuse the two 
with an emeliorating instruction as 
to horseplay that is not in any sense 
of the wrd reflected in the facts 
adduced at this trial." 20 Utah 2d 
at 285. 
- 4_ 
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Respondent submits that the facts of the present case do
 t 
not warrant an instruction on simple assault. A deadly 
weapon was used which caused a serious bodily injury. There 
is no view of the facts that would justify an instruction on 
simple assault. 
Before examining the facts it would be well to 
go over some definitions. Simple assault is defined in the 
Utah Code in Section 76-5-102 (Supp. 1975). The crime is 
committed either by (a) attempting, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another or by (b) threatening, 
accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. Nothing is said concerning an 
actually inflicted injury or the use of a deadly weapon. Those 
cases are covered by the crime of aggravated assault, which is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1973). Aggravated 
assault is committed when simple assault is established and 
either (a) a serious bodily injury is intentionally caused or 
(b) a deadly weapon, or force likely to produce a serious 
bodily injury, is used in the assault. 
-5-
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The appellant in the ins tan t case could have been 
convicted of aggravated assaul t i f he e i the r in ten t iona l ly 
caused Gary Ewell to suffer a serious bodily injury or i f 
he assaul ted Gary Ewell with a deadly weapon. Respondent 
submits tha t appellant did both and that h i s conviction could 
be affirmed on e i t he r ground. For de f in i t ions of other terms t 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (Supp. 1975), s t a t e s : 
" In ten t iona l ly . . . when i t i s 
his conscious object ive or desi re 
to engage in the conduct or cause the 
r e s u l t . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(9) s t a t e s : 
" 'Serious bodily injury1 means 
bodily injury that c rea tes or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, 
p ro t rac ted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or 
organ or creates a subs tan t ia l r isk 
of death." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) s t a t e s : 
"'Deadly or dangerous weapon1 
means anything tha t in the manner of 
i t s use or intended use is l ike ly to 
cause death or serious bodily in jury ." 
- 6 -
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An examination of the evidence demonstrates that 
the trial court handled the matter correctly. It is not 
disputed that Gary Ewell was struck and blinded in his left 
eye (T.12). Appellant admits grabbing the two pound steel 
tool with the "lug nut thing" on the end (T.83), and swinging 
it at Nielsen and Ewell (T.84) . Appellant also admits that . , 
his weapon was the instrument which gouged out Ewell1s eye 
(T.80) . Therefore, since a serious bodily injury and a deadly 
weapon are established, the jury couXd only come to one of two 
verdicts: "Guilty of Aggravated Assault" or "Not Guilty by Reason 
of a Justification." This case is simlar in this respect to 
State v. Hunter, supra , wherein the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"The trial court decided that it was 
all or nothing—and rightly so—under 
the facts of this case." 20 Utah 2d at 
284. 
Respondent submits that the evidence does not warrant 
an instruction on simple assault and that the trial court acted 
correctly. Actions of a trial court are indulged with a pre-
sumption of validity, and the burden is upon appellant to prove 
such serious inequity as to manifest clear abuse of discretion. 
-7-
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S e a r l e v . S e a r l e , U t a h , 522 P . 2 d 697 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . R e s p o n d e n t 
s u b m i t s t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o c a r r y t h e b u r d e n of 
p r o o f r e q u i r e d a n d a s k s t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n b e a f f i r m e d . 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN PREVENTING 
THE DEFENDANT FROM TESTIFYING AS TO HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS. 
W h i l e d i r e c t l y e x a m i n i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t , h i s a t t o r n e y 
a t t e m p t e d t o s u b m i t e v i d e n c e t o t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s 
s t a t e o f mind a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m i n a l a c t . The t r i a l c o u r t 
r u l e d : "He c a n t e s t i f y a s t o w h a t h a p p e n e d a n d w h a t w a s s a i d 
. . . Not h i s p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s . " ( T . 7 9 ) . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s 
t h a t t h i s r u l i n g w a s p r e j u d i c i a l s i n c e t h e i n t e n t i s s u e was 
e s s e n t i a l t o h i s p l e a o f d e f e n s e o f a t h i r d p e r s o n . R e s p o n d e n t 
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e r u l e d c o r r e c t l y a n d t h a t . t h e 
p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s o f t h e a p p e l l a n t w e r e n o t a t i s s u e . 
I n U t a h , a p e r s o n i s j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g f o r c e w h i c h i s 
i n t e n d e d o r l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o n l y 
i f h e r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e f o r c e i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t 
t h e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o f h i m s e l f o r a t h i r d p e r s o n . 
- 8 -
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (Supp. 1975). Appellant clearly 
* 
used force that was likely to cause serious bodily injury, 
as has been previously discussed. The question then is 
whether or not he reasonably believed that his brother was 
about to be killed or receive a serious bodily injury. 
The entire issue focuses on the word "reasonably." 
Guilt or innocence depend on what a "reasonable man" would 
have believed under the circumstances, not what the appellant 
himself believed. The question is: "Would a reasonable man 
have believed that Jim Peck was about to be killed or injured 
seriously?" 
The "reasonable man" standard must be assessed by 
the jury. It is the juryfs responsibility to decide whether 
or not a reasonable man would have done what appellant did 
under the circumstances. In State v. Hunter, supra, this Court 
said: 
"The urgence by counsel for defense 
i s that although there was an assaul t with 
a deadly weapon, the jury was e n t i t l e d to 
ponder as to the i n t en t to do bodily harm— 
which in our opinion i s nonsense under the 
fac t s of t h i s case . . . ." 
- 9 -
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Likewise, under the fac t s of the ins tan t case, the 
jury did not need to receive evidence on appellant f s s t a t e of 
mind. The jury had only t o ask themselves: "Under the same 
circumstances would I have at tacked Nielsen and Ewell with a 
deadly weapon." In State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 
P.2d 696 (1969), t h i s Court sa id : 
" . . . i t i s the j u r y ' s pr iv i lege 
to weigh and consider a l l of the other 
fac ts and circumstances shown in evidence 
in determining what they w i l l be l i eve . . . ."• 
22 Utah 2d at 378. 
The t r i a l court recognized t h i s duty of the jury and 
so ins t ruc ted them: 
"A person i s j u s t i f i e d in threatening 
or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably bel ieves tha t 
such force i s necessary t o defend himself 
o r a t h i r d person against such o t h e r ' s 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person i s j u s t i f i e d in using force which is 
intended or l i ke ly to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only i f he reasonably believes 
that the force i s necessary to prevent death 
or serious bodily injury to himself or a t h i r d 
^ person, or to prevent the commission of a 
•; forc ib le felony." Jury ins t ruc t ion No. 7. 
-10-
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i # 
• * 
f The jury evaluated the totality of the circumstances 
eft -
i n t h i s c a s e and d e c i d e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t was n o t j u s t i f i e d i n 
h i s a c t i o n s and t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e man would n o t h a v e done what 
a p p e l l a n t d i d . Such a f i n d i n g i s e n t i r e l y r e a s o n a b l e . J im 
Peck , t h e man who was r e c e i v i n g t h e b e a t i n g (and t o whose a i d 
a p p e l l a n t came) t e s t i f i e d h i m s e l f t h a t "nobody was h u r t much" , 
(T.73) . J 
The law i n Utah i s t h a t a j u r y v e r d i c t must s t a n d 
u n l e s s i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was s o i n c o n c l u s i v e o r 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds must have e n t e r e d r e a s o n -
a b l e d o u b t s t h a t t h e c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d . S t a t e v . S u l l i v a n , 
6 Utah 2d 110 , 307 P . 2 d 212 (1957) ; S t a t e v . Danks , 10 Utah 2d 
162 , 350 P . 2 d 146 (1960) . Responden t s u b m i t s t h a t the t r i a l 
c o u r t a c t e d c o r r e c t l y , t h a t t h e i s s u e was p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d , 
and t h a t t h e j u r y r e a s o n a b l y r e a c h e d a g u i l t y v e r d i c t and t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d . 
CONCLUSION 
Responden t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d p r o p e r l y 
i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . A j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e l e s s e r 
o f f e n s e of s i m p l e a s s a u l t was u n w a r r a n t e d by t h e f a c t s of t h e 
- 1 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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c a s e . A l s o , t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s s t a t e of mind, or p e r s o n a l 
f e e l i n g s , were n o t a t i s s u e . Responden t s e e k s a f f i 
rmance 
of t h e c o n v i c t i o n . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F . DORIUS 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Responden t 
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